Introductory description

PH9G2 Classics of Analytic Philosophy

Module aims

Outline syllabus

This is an indicative module outline only to give an indication of the sort of topics that may be covered. Actual sessions held may differ.

1. Analytic Philosophy – historical overview
2. Frege -- “On Sense and Reference”
3. Russell -- “On Denoting”
4. Moore -- “Proof of an External World”
5. Carnap – “Elimination of Metaphysics through the logical analysis of language”
6. Wittgenstein – Excerpts from Philosophical Investigations - Private language argument/philosophy as therapy.
7. Anscombe – “The First Person”
8. Quine -- “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”
9. Putnam -- “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”

Learning outcomes

By the end of the module, students should be able to:

• Subject knowledge and understanding: students should have an advanced understanding of debates about specific analytic philosophers and some of their core ideas, as well as an appreciation of aspects of the historical development of analytic philosophy.
• Key skills: students should be able to come to an independent interpretation and evaluation of the relevant literature, explain complex positions and arguments in their own words, and communicate those ideas and arguments clearly both orally and in writing
• Cognitive skills: students should be able to identify the important claims within readings, understand the structure of arguments, test views for strengths and weaknesses, make pertinent use of examples, and compare the substance of views consistently.
• Subject‐specific skills: students should be able to express themselves using precise philosophical vocabulary, appreciate varieties of analytic approaches and their interconnections, and engage independently in philosophical debate.

Indicative reading list

Ambrose, Alice and M. Lazerowitz (eds.) G. E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect Allen and Unwin, London: 1970.
Baghramian, Maria and Andrew Jorgensen 2012 “Quine, Kripke, and Putnam” in Beaney ed. Oxford Handbook of History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.
Beaney, M. 2012. “What is analytic philosophy?” “The historiography of analytic philosophy” “Chronology of analytic philosophy and its historiography” “Bibliography of analytic philosophy and its historiography” in Beaney ed. Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.

Bostock, David, 2012, Russell’s Logical Atomism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broad, C.D., 1973, “Bertrand Russell, as Philosopher,” Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society, 5: 328–341; repr. in A.D. Irvine (ed.) (1999) Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments, 4 vols, London: Routledge, vol 1, 1–15.
Burge, Tyler. 2012 “Gottlob Frege: some forms of influence.” In Beaney ed. Oxford Handbook of History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.
Coffa, Alberto. 1991. The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. Cambridge: CUP.
Coliva Annalisa. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense
2010, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa 2012. “Scepticism and knowledge: Moore's proof of an external world” in Beaney ed. Oxford Handbook of History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.
Crary, Alice, 2002, “The Happy Truth: J.L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words”, Inquiry, 45(1): 59–80. doi:10.1080/002017402753556616
Doxiadis, Apostolos, and Christos Papadimitriou, 2009, Logicomix: An Epic Search for Truth, New York: St Martin’s Press.
Dummett, M. ‘Frege's distinction between sense and reference’ in his Truth and Other Enigmas (Duckworth/Harvard UP, 1978).
Dummett, M. 1991. Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Ebbs, G. 2017. Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry. Cambridge: CUP.
Gabriel, Gottfried 2012. “Frege and the German background to analytic philosophy” in Beaney ed. Oxford Handbook of History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.
Griffin, Nicholas. 2012. “Russell and Moore's revolt against British idealism” in Beaney ed. Oxford Handbook of History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.
Heal, Jane, 1974, “Explicit Performative Utterances and Statements”, Philosophical Quarterly, 24(95): 106–121. doi:10.2307/2217715
Hylton, Peter W., 1990a, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon.
Hylton, Peter W. 2010. Quine. London: Routledge.
Jack, Julie, 1981, “Stating and Otherwise Subscribing”, Philosophia, 10(3): 283–313.
Kanterian, E. “Privacy and Private Language” in Glock, H. J. and Hyman, J. ed. Blackwell Companion to Wittgtenstein. 2017. Wiley: Blackwell.
Kaplan, David, 1970, “What is Russell’s Theory of Descriptions?” in Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck, (eds), Physics, Logic, and History, New York: Plenum, 277–288; repr. in David F. Pears (ed.), Bertrand Russell: A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, 227–244.
Linsky, Bernard. 2012. “Russell's theory of descriptions and the idea of logical construction” in Beaney ed. Oxford Handbook of History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.
Makin, G. ‘Frege’s Distinction between Sense and Reference’, Philosophy Compass, 5/2, 2010.
Neale, S., 1990. Descriptions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Books.
Passmore, J. 1968. A Hundred Years of Philosophy. London: Penguin.
Proust, Joelle. 1989. Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic Propostion from Kant to Carnap. University of Minnesota Press.
Richardson, A. and Übel, T. (eds.), 2007, The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, Gillian. “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction” 2014, Philosophy Compass 2(5): 712–729.
P. A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G. E. Moore Northwestern University Press, Evanston ILL: 1942.
Schilpp, P. (ed.), 1963, The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
Snowdon, P. 2012. “Private Experience and Sense Data” in Oscar Kuusela and Marie McGinn eds. Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford: OUP.
Stroud, Barry The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1984.
Thomasson, Amie. “Carnap and the Prospects for Easy Ontology” Stephen Blatti and Sandra Lapointe eds. Ontology After Carnap. Oxford: OUP.
Uebel, Thomas. 2012. “Early logical empiricism and its reception: the case of the Vienna Circle” in Beaney ed. Oxford Handbook of History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.
Warnock, G. J. 1989. J. L. Austin. London: Routledge.

Subject specific skills

(i) The ability to understand philosophical issues and arguments that figure in the background to contemporary work. (ii) The ability to critically engage with philosophical ideas and arguments.
(iii) The ability to articulate philosophical issues and arguments.
(iv) The ability to read philosophical texts, including an ability to understand and explain technical philosophical vocabulary from these historical texts, an awareness of debates about the historical context of these texts, and of debates about interpretation of certain key terms

Transferable skills

(i) The ability to communicate information (verbally and in written form) to people both expert and non-expert in the field.
(ii) The ability to analyse, evaluate, critique and apply complex information gathered from reading, reflection, reasoning or communication.
(iii) The ability to effectively manage schedules and deadlines.